src/frontmatter.py grows from a single-key reader into the full machine
contract: reader (read_frontmatter_value, unchanged), one parse primitive
(parse_frontmatter), writer (render/write_frontmatter), schema validator
(validate_schema/REQUIRED_FIELDS, warning-only by default) and a shared
strip_frontmatter helper. The five verdict gates (check_reviewer_verdict,
_parse_tests_verdict, _parse_deploy_status, _parse_staging_status,
parse_security_status) now read through the single parse_frontmatter point
instead of duplicated ad-hoc YAML logic; review_parse._strip_frontmatter and
security_gate.extract_security_findings reuse the shared helper.
Strictly backward compatible + never-raise: STAGE_TRANSITIONS, the QG_CHECKS
composition, verdict semantics (incl. ORCH-047 three-field tester + negative
token priority), reason-strings and worktree->origin/main fallback are 1:1.
The schema validator never influences a gate verdict by default; hard-fail is
reserved behind the frontmatter_validation_strict kill-switch (default False).
New formal handoff spec docs/_standards/HANDOFF_PROTOCOL.md ("stage -> required
output" + required frontmatter schema), aligned 1:1 with PIPELINE_DOCS.md.
Tests: test_frontmatter.py (TC-01..07), test_qg_verdicts.py (TC-08..15),
test_security_gate.py (TC-12), test_stages_invariants.py (TC-16). Full
tests/ green (1212).
Refs: ORCH-076
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a deterministic (no-LLM) security sub-gate on the deploy-staging -> deploy
edge, run FIRST (before merge-gate ORCH-043 and image-freshness ORCH-058) so it
fails cheaply before any expensive rebase/rebuild, and scans origin/main..HEAD
before rebase so a task is never blamed for a CVE introduced by an updated main.
Why: the autonomous pipeline merged branches into main with no check for a leaked
secret or a vulnerable dependency. For the self-hosting orchestrator (one shared
prod instance serving every project from a shared DB) a single leak/CVE landed in
the prod of all projects (CLAUDE.md self-hosting, section 8).
- New leaf src/security_gate.py (never-raise): gitleaks (offline, fail-closed on
tool error => secrets guarantee is unconditional) + pip-audit (best-effort;
unreachable CVE feed degrades fail-open + loud warning by default, strict via
security_dep_audit_fail_closed). Verdict lives ONLY in 17-security-report.md
YAML frontmatter (write -> read-back single source of truth); FAIL is
authoritative; missing/broken frontmatter => fail-closed.
- check_security_gate thin wrapper registered in QG_CHECKS (lazy import, no cycle).
- _handle_security_gate wired FIRST in advance_stage deploy-staging block: FAIL ->
rollback to development + developer-retry (cap MAX_DEVELOPER_RETRIES); task_desc
carries verbatim findings (ORCH-046 pattern). No merge-lease release (runs before
lease acquire). Self-hosting safe: only reads/scans/writes, never deploys.
- Conditional rollout (security_gate_enabled + security_gate_repos; empty scope ->
self-hosting only). 6 new ORCH_SECURITY_* settings.
- Infra: pinned gitleaks Go binary in Dockerfile (+curl/ca-certificates), pip-audit
in requirements.txt, versioned .gitleaks.toml at repo root.
- STAGE_TRANSITIONS and DB schema unchanged.
Docs: docs/architecture/README.md (marked realized), CLAUDE.md (artifact 17),
CHANGELOG.md. Tests: test_security_gate.py, test_qg_security.py,
test_stage_engine_security_gate.py + updated registry/edge snapshots.
Refs: ORCH-022
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
